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Abstract 
This paper argues the importance of ethnic affinity in determining migration 
patterns using a newly constructed late- and post-Soviet dataset. The members of 
various indigenous ethnic groups, who had been spread across the Soviet 
territories, had to decide whether or not to leave the land in which they suddenly 
became diaspora after the dissolution of the USSR. The migration literature 
conventionally claims that potential migrants respond to the economic 
differentials between source and destination, but the post-Soviet case reveals that 
ethnicity also played a crucial and independent role in migration decision and 
destination choice. The trend of ethnic un-mixing is evidently seen in the novel 
dataset regarding the regional migration patterns of major ethnic groups in the 
post-Soviet space. Econometric analyses using this dataset also confirm that 
ethnic composition of a region, along with labour market conditions, has 
significant effects on the regional migration patterns. 
 
 
Introduction 
The conventional wisdom in the migration literature is that potential migrants 
decide to move when the destination can offer better economic opportunities than 
the source (Constant and Zimmerman 2013, for survey). However, I argue that 
ethnic affinity is as important as economic conditions in determining migration 
decision and destination choice because of the following reasons. 
 
Firstly, as argued by Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2010), people tend to feel happier 
and safer when they are surrounded by those who have the same identity as theirs. 
Ethnicity usually comes up to the surface as an important element of identity 
when people consider migration. Secondly, migrants would benefit from a specific 
kind of network effect when they move to the place where their compatriots have 
already settled, for example, through the channel of access to informal 
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employment (Frey and Liaw 2005; Kritz et al. 2011). Lastly, policymakers might 
also want to avoid high ethnic diversity because it is often claimed in the literature 
that the ethnic fragmentation is harmful to the economic performance, unless 
there are fine institutions that can deal with the problems arising from this 
diversity (Alesina and La Ferrara 2005). Therefore, it is possible for the 
governments to adopt the policies favourable to the majority group and/or 
discriminative to the minorities. These may affect migration patterns. 
 
While the literature tends to focus on the US and European immigration, the 
USSR and its successor states afterwards also offer a fruitful ground to see 
whether this ethnic factor has worked. The Soviet Union was one of the most 
ethnically diverse political entities in human history, whose residing ethnic groups, 
or nationalities1, had been given complex status between autonomy and subjection. 
Notwithstanding the Marxist ideology of internationalism, Lenin and Stalin 
committed to national self-determination and established territorial units based 
on ethnicity (Suny 1989, p.506). 15 of over 100 different ethnic groups were given 
autonomy, at least in theory, over their own Union Republics (e.g. Russian SFSR, 
Armenian SSR, Kazakh SSR, etc.) and 20 had their autonomous republics (Tatar 
ASSR, Yakut ASSR, etc.) 2 . Many ethnic minorities (Poles, Germans, Jews, 
Koreans, etc.), as well as above-mentioned “titular nationalities” were provided 
with a certain extent of autonomy including “mother-tongue” education, national 
units in political parties, and national quotas in colleges, etc. (Slezkine 1994, 
p.422)3. 
 
However, the titular groups had not been confined to their autonomous territories 
but kept being sent, or encouraged to move, towards less developed and less 
densely-populated regions under the slogan of balanced regional development and 
                                                             
1  Soviet authorities regarded the term “nationality (Natsional'nost', in Russian)” roughly 
equivalent to ethnicity, and used this as a unit of social accounting, e.g. by recording it in internal 
passport (propiska) or census. 
2 SFSR: Soviet Federative Socialist Republic; SSR: Soviet Socialist Republic; ASSR: Autonomous 
Soviet Socialist Republic 
3 For more details as to how the ethnic nationality was formed and institutionalised, see Brubaker 
1998 and Suny 1993. 
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“ethnic equalisation”. The authorities used first coercions and later incentive 
mechanisms to control migration of their citizens4. This control clearly involved 
ethnic movements, such as massive forced migration of Volga Germans or Koreans 
to Central Asia (Polian 2004, p.98) and dispersion of ethnic Russians and Central 
Asians to Siberia (Kaiser 1994, p.117). These left the members of different ethnic 
groups distributed across the vast territory of the Soviet Union. Just before the 
dissolution of the USSR in 1991, the number of Soviet people living outside their 
own “national” territory was 73 million (Brubaker 1994, p. 57). 
 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union lifted the restrictions on free movement all of 
sudden. This brought about dramatic shifts in migration patterns. Not only had 
they become diaspora in the lands where they had long been living, but also they 
faced the nationalist policies of independent former Soviet Union (FSU, henceforth) 
republics. The demand for independence of union republics in the late-Soviet 
period was translated into discriminative policies against non-titular ethnic 
groups during the state-building process in the 90s (Korobkov 2003) 5 . These 
formed both a push factor driving the non-indigenous groups away from their 
living space and a pull factor attracting titular groups to their own national region. 
Given the preserved ethnic identity and lack of restrictions against the migration 
among FSU states, the post-Soviet space becomes a perfect stage for researchers 
to look into the relationship between ethnicity and migration.  
 
Despite this, the previous literature has paid little attention to the ethnic aspects. 
Most post-Soviet migration studies tend to focus on its relationship with the labour 
market conditions, insofar as quantitative research is concerned (Mitchneck 1991, 
Andrienko and Guriev 2004, Guriev and Vakulenko 2015, etc.). The only attempt 
to quantitatively analyse the ethnic aspect of the post-Soviet migration was Locher 
(2002). She includes “ethnic sorting” as an explanatory variable to see if migrants 
tend to move to the areas in which the proportion of their own ethnic group is high.                                                              
4 For example, oil and gas industries were established in West Siberia attracting people from the 
European part (Gibson 1991, pp.147-148). 
5 For example, most Central Asian independent FSU states explicitly discriminated Russian-
speaking population in employment or education. For more details, see Korobkov 2003. 
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She did find the evidence of significant ethnic sorting on 80 ethnic movements 
during the 90s, though the sample size was small and dataset was not complete.  
 
The previous works have room for improvement in three major areas. Firstly, little 
attention has been paid to ethnic aspects of the migration movements, though each 
of the ethnic groups has shown distinctive migration patterns. The ethnic aspect, 
which may have many interesting implications to the present migration discussion, 
could not be fully exploited in the previous works. Secondly, none of them has 
spanned both pre- and post-dissolution periods altogether. The data are 
concentrating on the post-Soviet period, and some late-Soviet studies did not 
extend their datasets to the later period. As a result, it was hard to directly 
compare the different characteristics between pre- and post-collapse migration 
patterns and their determinants, which may show how institutional changes shape 
migration movements. Lastly, the analyses on regional migration patterns tend to 
concentrate on Russian Federation, again mainly due to data availability. Since 
the inter-republic migration accounts for over 95% of total migrants during the 
Soviet period and around 80% even after the dissolution, it is crucial to include non-
Russian states for a more accurate understanding of Soviet migration patterns.  
 
To improve upon these points, my paper begins with constructing a more reliable 
dataset on the regional net migration of major ethnic groups using the Soviet and 
post-Soviet census data and administrative vital records. The newly constructed 
database will show that many titular ethnic groups which had been distributed 
across the Soviet territories moved to their own titular FSU states, e.g. Kazakhs 
to Kazakhstan or Ukrainians to Ukraine, after the collapse. This change in the 
migration patterns cannot be fully explained by the economic conditions because 
many have moved from more to less developed regions. Ethnicity must have played 
a role inferring from the fact that most of the FSU states saw an increase in their 
titular population after the collapse. 
 
I then move on to use econometric techniques to verify this idea. I regress the 
constructed regional net migration rates on the share of each ethnic group and 
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economic conditions, e.g. wages and employment rates, to compare the size of their 
relative contributions. The results confirm that the trend of ethnic mixing which 
had occurred in the Soviet period was reversed after its dissolution and the 
following abolition of migration restrictions. This means that the migrants are 
now more likely to decide to move out of a region when they have fewer co-ethnics 
in the region and/or they tend to choose the destinations where the proportion of 
their co-ethnics in the regional population is high.  
 
All in all, the novel dataset and econometric analysis both confirm the importance 
of ethnicity in determining the late- and post-Soviet migration patterns. The rest 
of the paper will proceed to elaborate on the main idea discussed in the 
introduction. Two following main sections discuss (1) the estimation method and 
results of the main dataset, the regional net migration of ethnic groups, and (2) the 
quantitative analyses testing the effect of ethnic affinity in the Soviet and post-
Soviet migration. I will conclude in the last section.  
 
 
Estimating regional net migration of ethnic groups 
Data and Method 
Though there were some attempts to investigate the extent of ethnic redistribution 
for the Soviet and post-Soviet periods (Anderson and Silver 1989, Schwartz 1991, 
Kaiser 1994; Robertson 1996, Heleniak 1997 and 2003), none of these provided 
comprehensive measures as to regional level migration. This section, therefore, 
aims to construct the regional net migration of major ethnic groups using the 
ethnic composition data from censuses and vital statistics published by official 
statistics agencies of the USSR and FSU states. These agencies provide the 
relevant data down to the oblast/kray/ASSR level (oblast level, henceforth) as 
shown in Figure 1.  
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
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The change in ethnic composition over the last decade of the Soviet era can be 
obtained from the 1979 and 1989 USSR censuses. Since the data are available at 
the oblast level, I can track the population change of a certain ethnic group in an 
oblast over the intercensal period. Provided that the data for the 10-year total 
natural increase are available, it is possible to calculate the regional level net 
migration of the ethnic group by the residual method. The estimation strategy to 
obtain 10-year net migration of ethnic group i in region r can be summarised as 
follows.  
 
𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟,79_89𝑖𝑖 = �𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,89𝑖𝑖 − 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,79𝑖𝑖 � − 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟,79_89𝑖𝑖     where 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟,79_89𝑖𝑖 = 𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑁𝑁ℎ𝑟𝑟,78_89 − 𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁ℎ𝑟𝑟,79_89 
 
𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟,79_89𝑖𝑖  is 10-year total net migration, 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  is beginning of the year population 
and 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟,79_89𝑖𝑖  is the natural increase from 1979 to 19896, which are all of ethnic 
group i in region r. Using the 10-year crude births (𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑁𝑁ℎ𝑟𝑟,78_89), crude deaths 
(𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁ℎ𝑟𝑟,79_89) of a particular region and the share of each ethnic group in the 
region’s population (𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 ), I estimate the natural increase of each group in the region 
(𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟,79_89𝑖𝑖 ). Birth counts are adjusted for ethnic specific fertility weight (𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖). 
 
Two publications of Goskomstat USSR (1988, 1989) provided the annual data of 
crude birth and death in 15 union republics from 1979 to 1989, while the regional 
level natural increase is available for the years 1980, 1985, 1986, and 1988. In 
order to fill the gap between these years, I assume that the population growth in 
a union republic was proportionally contributed by the growth rates of population 
in its oblasts7. By applying the growth rate of the republic to the regional data of 
four base years, the annual natural increase for other 6 years can be estimated.   
 
Since all these natural increase data are not available at the ethnicity level, I 
estimate the natural increase of each ethnic group in a region with the assumption 
                                                             
6 Sum of the natural increase from 1979 to 1988 
7 Rowland does a similar practice when he estimates the natural increase for total population 
(Rowland 1990, p.659) 
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that the total natural increase in a region is contributed by the residing ethnic 
groups according to their shares (𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 ). That is, if the share of Tatars in the regional 
population is 35%, then 35% of the natural increase in the region is attributable 
to Tatars. However, since each ethnic group has different fertility rates, the 
contribution of each ethnicity to regional birth counts is adjusted for fertility 
weight (𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖)8. Using republic level data, I run a regression of the average number 
of births per woman on urbanisation rates and sex ratio imbalance9 to predict the 
fertility rates of each ethnic group in a certain region.  
 
[insert Figure 2 here] 
 
From Figure 2, it is clearly seen that both urbanisation rates and sex ratio 
imbalance are negatively associated with fertility. In other words, the more 
urbanised an ethnic group is and the bigger the difference between the numbers 
of their men and women is, the fewer babies a woman is likely to have in her life. 
Some regressions confirm this prediction as Column (1) of Table 1 shows that the 
coefficient of urbanisation is -1.42 and sex imbalance is -2.29, with both being 
significant at 1% level. I add a dummy variable, Central Asia because it had been 
reported that Central Asian nationals had higher fertility than others during the 
Soviet era. Column (2) confirms the prediction by showing the positive and 
significant coefficient of this variable. Alternatively, in Column (3) and (4), I 
replace the sex ratio imbalance variable with its logarithmic form, assuming that 
the relationship between sex imbalance and fertility is non-linear. The regressions 
with logarithm fit the model better and report a negative coefficient which implies 
that the curve is concave to the origin. The explanatory power (measured by R2) is 
the biggest in the fourth model so I apply the fitted values to each ethnicity in each 
region to obtain 𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖, controlling for some outliers10.  
 
                                                             
8 The fertility rates of Slavic and Baltic nationalities tend to be lower than those of Central Asian 
ones. 
9 Sex ratio = |(Male population / Female population) – 1| 
10 Outliers come out mostly when the number of residents is too small and the ratio of men to 
women is over 2.  
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[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
With this weight, the contribution of an ethnic group is inflated or deflated 
according to the fertility rate of the group. Since I have no data regarding the 
mortality rates available at the ethnic level and I find little evidence that the rates 
were significantly different among ethnic groups during the Soviet period, I made 
an assumption that the death rate is the same across the nationalities. Once the 
regional natural increase and net migration for each ethnic group are estimated, 
they can be summed up to union republic and the whole USSR levels. 
 
The same method can be applied to the post-Soviet period. Censuses were 
conducted in the FSU states around the year 200011, and most of them reveal the 
ethnic information, often at the regional level. The availability and level of birth 
and death counts vary across the countries, but the biggest states in the area, 
including Russia and Ukraine, usually have regional level vital statistics. Whereas 
the oblast-level data is sometimes unavailable, namely for Central Asian states, 
union republic level net migration can be calculated for the whole FSU area for 
the 1990s. 
 
Results 
From the tables and maps below, we can see the regions to and from which the 
major ethnic groups migrate in the last decade of the Soviet period and the first 
decade after its dissolution. Tables 2 and 3 summarise the net migration of major 
ethnic groups at the raion-level12, giving the estimated annual average levels and 
rates per 1000 in the periods of 1979-89 and 1989-2000, respectively. Figures 3 
and 4 shows the annual net migration rates of selected ethnic groups at the level 
of lower administrative divisions, oblast. Red oblasts have net out-migration and 
Blue ones have net in-migration, whereas light yellow means net migration near 
zero.                                                              
11 Only exception is Uzbekistan, where no census has been undertaken since independence. The 
ethnic composition data was obtained from another source, Ilkhamov and Zhukova (2002). 
12 Raion in this paper refers to the economic regions, the basis unit on which the Soviet authority 
planned economic policies and compare regional performance (Bernard 2013, pp.33-34) 
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[Insert Table 2 here] 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
 
On the top left of Figure 3 shows the redistribution of total Soviet population from 
Central Asia to European part, namely the Baltics and Central raion of Russia, 
and Siberia during the late-Soviet period. This trend is mainly led by ethnic 
Russians, shown from the net migration of ethnic Russians on the top right. Net 
out-migration from Central Asia and Trans-Caucasus is seen more clearly, and 
net in-migration into Slavic and Baltic regions is also quite intense. The out-
migration migration of ethnic Russians from non-Slavic southern republics is 
argued by the previous literature to have begun from the mid-1970s and continued 
during the transition period (Kaiser 1994, p.166; Zaionchkovskaia 1996, pp. 17-18; 
Codagnone 1998, p.89; Heleniak 2003, p. 137). As shown in Table 2, the 
destination of the ethnic Russians arriving in RSFSR seems to have been Northern, 
Central and Siberian areas. Central Raion, including Moscow, was one of the most 
popular destinations for most ethnic groups except Jews, while Siberia was also 
attracting the members of many ethnic groups in the 80s.  
 
Similar to the Russians, Ukrainians also show positive net migration in the 
European part and negative in Central Asia. The difference is that they appear to 
have left their titular republic and spread across all the regions of Russia and 
neighbouring republics. This is also seen in Table 2, showing that the Ukrainians 
out-migrated from Donetsk-Dnieper and South West raions of Ukrainian SSR and 
in-migrated to all other regions, except for Ural, Trans-Caucasus, Kazakhstan and 
Moldovan raions. Two other major titular ethnic groups, Armenians and Kazakhs, 
show distinctive migration patterns during this period. It is observed that the both 
ethnic groups have gained population through the net migration in most of the 
regions of the USSR except in their own titular republics. The figures in Table 2 
show that the Armenians and Kazakhs show negative net migration in Armenia 
and Kazakhstan, whereas it is positive in all other regions.   
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The net migration patterns dramatically changed after the collapse. The biggest 
difference is the increase of net out-migration regions, partly explained by the fact 
that the restrictions on the international emigration were lifted in the late 80s. 
Also, the absolute number of net migration, which reflects the extent of movement, 
became much larger compared to pre-dissolution counterparts. The map for all 
nationalities on the top left shows that the intensifying net-out migration from 
Central Asia and the new trend of the population losing in Siberia. The European 
part of Russian Federation appears to gain population through net migration 
during this period.  
 
Looking at the net migration of ethnic Russians, the fleeing from the southern part 
of the former USSR territories had continued in an enlarged extent. The out-
migration of ethnic Russians was most intense in the war-torn regions, namely 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Tajikistan where there were ethnic conflicts 
and civil wars in the late 80s and early 90s. The net out-migration rate of ethnic 
Russians in Trans-Caucasus raion skyrocketed from 24.6 per 1000 in the 80s to 
102.5 per 1000 in the 90s, and those in Central Asia and Kazakhstan also marked 
as high as 70.9 and 50 per 1000, respectively, as shown in Tables 2 and 3. What is 
different from the 80s is that the ethnic Russians have left not only the southern 
raions but also all other non-titular FSU states. Their net migration rates in the 
Ukraine, Belarus, and Baltics were all negative. They appear to have returned to 
Central and North Caucasus raions in Russian Federation, confirming the 
conclusion of the previous literature with actual data to hand (Codagnone 1998, 
p.49, Heleniak 2003, pp. 137-139).  
 
[Insert Figure 5 here] 
 
The maps in Figure 5 compare the net migration patterns of each titular 
nationality in its national republic (including ASSRs), e.g. Latvians in Latvia or 
Yakuts in Yakut ASSR. It seems that many titular nationalities left their home 
territories as red regions are more frequently observed, especially in densely 
populated western parts. It can be inferred that the titular groups were leaving 
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for other parts of the USSR where their co-ethnics are relatively scarce and thus 
ethnic mixing was happening. This trend is shown completely reversed in the post-
collapse period. The map on the bottom reveals that most of the ethnic groups 
residing in their titular states mostly have positive net migration rates. This map 
has more blue regions than its pre-collapse counterpart and this change is more 
clearly observed in the densely populated European and Central Asian parts. The 
pattern of return migration was vividly observed in the maps of two major titular 
nationalities, Ukrainians and Kazakhs in Figure 4, where the net migration is 
positive only in their homes and negative in all other regions. Ukrainian and 
Kazakh cases are especially interesting in that the post-Soviet trend had shown 
dramatic reverse compared to that of the late-Soviet period, as they decided to 
leave relatively affluent Russia and Baltic countries for less developed Ukraine 
and Kazakhstan.  
 
The migration trends revealed in my dataset shed light on the motivation of the 
migrants during the transition period. Firstly, it can be inferred that the ethnicity 
played a role in population distribution. The changing directions of migration from 
pre- to post-collapse periods indicate that the trends shifted from ethnic mixing to 
ethnic un-mixing13. Migrants are likely to have considered the share of their own 
ethnic groups in the destinations when deciding to move, especially after the 
dissolution. Secondly, the fact that the regions with the highest wages and living 
conditions, e.g. Tyumen oblast, tend to have positive net migration might suggest 
that economic conditions also had some influence on migration patterns. This 
might confirm that income differentials, which have been the conventional 
determinants of migration, also worked in Soviet and post-Soviet migration 
decision. Lastly, the regions suffering from civil wars and political conflicts, 
notably Transcaucasia, show the highest level of net out-migration. It is not too 
bold to argue that the migrants wanted to avoid conflicts and decided to leave the 
places. These findings need some verification to be accepted as a solid conclusion, 
which will be done in the next section with some econometric techniques. 
                                                             
13 Ethnic un-mixing is the process where migration decreases ethnic or national heterogeneity in 
the receiving regions (Brubaker 1998, p.1047) 
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Econometric verification 
Hypotheses 
The economic differentials between source and destination have been 
conventionally pointed out as a key determinant of migration flows and this 
hypothesis has been empirically tested for many regions and periods (Constant and 
Zimmerman 2013, for survey). The role of economic conditions in the Soviet context 
was also argued to be significant, as discussed in the introduction.  
 
Yet to be fully discussed in the literature is the hypothesis that the ethnic factor 
is as important as the economic ones in determining migration. I will argue that 
individuals have an incentive to live in the region where the share of their co-
ethnics is high and the government, depending on its institutional arrangements, 
also prefers its country to be ethnically homogenous.  
 
The starting point is the influence of identity on an individual’s economic 
behaviours. Akerlof and Kranton (2010) define identity as a person’s sense of self, 
and it is affected by his/her gender, ethnicity, religion or any groups they belong 
to. They argue that a rational individual would seek to achieve their ideal self and 
may sacrifice monetary compensation for this purpose. Ethnicity, as an element 
forming identity, would affect migration decision as ethnic identity comes up to 
the surface when a person migrates to a society dominated by other ethnicities. 
 
In fact, increasingly many scholars have concluded that the ethnic identity of 
immigrants and labour market outcomes in their destination are closely related 
(Constant and Zimmermann 2008, 2013, Bisin et al. 2011, Hatton and Leigh 2011, 
Patacchini and Zenou 2012). If the ethnic identity is one of the most important 
factors affecting migrants’ economic performance, and therefore will affect the 
decision making and destination selection process of potential migrants in the first 
place. There is also a handful of research which supports the direct role of ethnicity 
in the migration decision itself, most of which focus on US ethnic minorities (Kritz 
and Nogle 1994, Gurak and Kritz 2000, Frey and Liaw 2005). Kritz and Nogle 
maintain that the larger the number of compatriots residing in a region, the less 
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likely their out-migration occurs as immigrant communities work as social capital. 
Similarly, Frey and Liaw suggest cultural constraints such as kinship ties, social 
support network, and access to informal employment opportunities for the reasons 
of ethnic sorting happening (Frey and Liaw 2005, p.208).  
 
The ethnic sorting or unsorting through migration is also a matter of serious 
concern to policymakers, as it is thought to affect the economic development and 
social stability of a country. A survey paper regarding this matter concludes that 
ethnically heterogeneous society has been disadvantaged in terms of economic 
growth while the negative impact may be alleviated when the government can 
coordinate the diversity (Alesina and La Ferrara 2005, p.763). Poor policy 
management and political instability are two channels through which ethnic 
diversity exacerbates economic performance. The conflict of preferences due to the 
heterogeneity often diverts resources from productive investment to rent-seeking 
behaviour (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005, p.308). In addition, ethnically 
diverse societies may be prone to ethnic violence, riots and even military conflicts, 
as it is more difficult to coordinate the distribution of scarce resources (Vanhanen 
1999, p.58). For these reasons, the government may have an incentive to 
strengthen ethnic homogeneity of the country.  
 
Granted, there has been a view that the diversity can be a good stimulus to the 
economy under certain circumstances. Lazear (1999, 2000) and Collier (2000) 
argued that better political institutions can mitigate the adverse effect of ethnic 
diversity and make the most of spillovers and complementarities arising from 
different skills, experiences and ideas by coordinating communication. This claim 
has been supported by some recent empirical works such as Bellini et al. (2013) 
and Alesina et al. (2016). Therefore, it is not deniable that the government can 
work to increase the heterogeneity of the country at some stage of its economic 
development.  
 
In this sense, it is worth noting that the ethnic sorting is not always occurring. 
Rather, migration is usually associated with the trend of “ethnic mixing”, which 
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happens in the course of attracting foreigners into a society as a policy objective, 
e.g. in the countries experiencing labour shortage (Brubaker 2008, p. 1047). I will 
show that ethnic mixing was actually happening before the restrictions on 
migration were lifted, as a special case observed in the society heavily controlling 
labour distribution.   
 
Data and Method 
I will do the main regressions on the post-collapse dataset (1989-200014), though 
my dataset spans both late- and post-Soviet periods. Since the two periods show a 
stark contrast in terms of migration patterns and economic conditions, the pooled 
estimators do not give meaningful interpretations. Let alone the significant shifts 
in the political and economic regimes, the abolition of internal passport (or its 
distributional nature) and emigration restrictions brought a huge difference to the 
motivation of potential migrants and actual migration decisions. In addition, it is 
possible to gather more complete regional data of explanatory variables for the 
latter period15. Therefore, I will begin with the regressions on post-Soviet sample 
as a benchmark, and then will see if the pre-collapse counterpart shows any 
differences to the former. Where possible, however, all the explanatory variables 
on the right-hand side are equally included in the specifications of both periods for 
comparison even though some of these do not have significance in one of two 
periods. 
 
I select eight major ethnic groups, including ethnic Russians, Ukrainians, 
Belarussians, Armenians, Kazakhs, Tatars, Jews and Germans to include in my 
specification16. I gathered the dataset regarding the share of major ethnic groups 
in each region and the performance of different regions so that I can compare their 
relative impacts on the net migration patterns. As well as having simple OLS 
estimators, I also try to correct selection bias by two-step Heckman selection 
                                                             
14 The post-collapse sample overlaps about three years of the Soviet period (89-91), it does not affect 
the discussion too much as the migration restrictions began to be lifted from the late 80s. 
15 Most of the regional level data is available only for 1985 and 90 as to the Soviet period.  
16 The criteria for selection include the size of population, even distribution across the whole USSR, 
and data availability. The selection issues will be dealt with later.  
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estimator.  The main specification is as follows: 
 (𝑀𝑀 𝑃𝑃⁄ )𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑁𝑁0 + 𝑁𝑁1𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁ℎ𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛ℎ𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑁𝑁2𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑊𝑊𝐷𝐷𝑟𝑟, 𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑁𝑁3𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡−1+ 𝑁𝑁3𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟 + (𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸_𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁ℎ𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸)′𝛽𝛽 +  𝑋𝑋′𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡𝛾𝛾 + 𝜀𝜀𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡 
 
The dependent variable is the net migration per 1,000 persons. Though it would 
be ideal if there is in- and out-migration data separately, the net migration is also 
acceptable as an ethnic group usually moved in the same direction in a region, i.e. 
if they tend to move out of a region, they do so continuously over a certain period. 
To calculate annual net migration rates, I divide ten-year total net migration by 
10 and then by the average population and multiply 100017.  
 
I assumed that these regional net migration rates of an ethnic group (𝑀𝑀 𝑃𝑃⁄ )𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡 are 
determined by two major factors, the share of the ethnic group in the region and 
the economic conditions. The economic conditions of a region can be measured by 
the level of wages and employment. I included the level and/or growth of wages to 
measure the compensation which the potential migrants may receive in the source 
and destination. As there was no unemployment data for the Soviet period – they 
claimed full employment all the time, – I used the share of employment relative to 
the regional population in the hope that it can stand proxy for how active the 
regional economy is18.  
 
The food consumption level was included to supplement the wage level because 
Sovietologists often discredit the use of official wage data. In the Soviet period, 
official labour statistics were prepared by enterprises and organisations on the 
purpose of administrative reporting. As these enterprises and organisations were 
evaluated by the authority in terms output and employment targets, they had a 
strong incentive to distort and falsify the data reported (Clarke 1999, p.273). Also, 
due to multiple prices (e.g. black market), it is hard to produce real wages from                                                              
17 The number of years between two census points is not always 10 for all FSU countries in the 
post-Soviet period. For example, the first census in Russian Federation was 2002, so I first estimate 
13-year total net migration and divide it by 13.  
18 Unemployment rates were available for post-Soviet period, so I use these data where applicable. 
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the nominal wages. Real consumption is thought to be more accurate in measuring 
the actual living standard of the Soviet people, so I approximate this real 
consumption by the level of food consumption per capita in a region.  
 
Besides these main variables, dummy for each of 7 ethnicities except Russians is 
included to capture the ethnic-specific characters which might have influenced the 
migration decision. For example, some ethnic groups, such as Armenians showed 
a tendency to have high in-migration throughout the regions whereas others, 
notably Jews, showed exactly the opposite. I also included the dummy for 
war/conflicts, with any war-torn regions being coded 1, and other control variables 
such as ethnic fractionalisation/polarisation, urbanisation rates, crime rates, 
number of schools, hospital beds, January/July temperatures etc. in the equation 
to see if the other factors related to living standards affect the migration patterns19. 
 
As to the data for the explanatory variables, I mostly consulted the official 
statistics agencies of the USSR and FSU states to obtain other explanatory 
variables. The first publication of Regiony Rossii (Rostat 2002) contained detailed 
regional statistics for two years (1985 and 1990) of the Soviet period and the 
annual data from 1995, and Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR (Goskomstat USSR 
1991) and Official Statistics of CIS states (CISstat 2008) were utilised for the data 
of non-Russian republics and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS, 
henceforth) states. As three Baltic states were not included in the CIS, I visited 
the websites of statistical agencies of each state and collected the relevant data.  
 
I first run a regression using a basic OLS estimator. Endogeneity caused by 
reverse causation is not a big problem in this specification as I used lagged 
variables for main explanatory variables and it is hard to believe that the future 
ethnic migration affected the ethnic share or wage levels of the past in any forms. 
It is especially the case in the Soviet case because the wages were exogenously 
determined by the government and they were unlikely to be correlated with the 
post-Soviet counterparts.                                                              
19 Definition and sources of all variables can be provided in Appendix if required by referees. 
17 
On the other hand, the OLS estimator may be biased because of sample selection 
problem, as I selected only 8 out of over 120 ethnic groups residing in the Soviet 
Union. Also, even for the 8 major groups, the ethnic share or net migration data 
are not available for some regions, especially when the ethnic groups has a 
negligible share in the regional population. This might cause bias in the coefficient 
of main regressors because it is hard to believe that the smaller, and thus more-
often omitted, ethnic groups tend to have less likelihood of migration.  
 
To avoid this problem, I applied a typical two-step Heckman selection model, with 
the main selection variable of log regional population in first step probit regression. 
As summarised in the below equation, I assume that the ethnic data is likely to be 
missing when its share is below 0.05% of the regional population. The likelihood 
of missing may be dependent on the absolute size of the regional population, 
because the bigger the region is, the bigger the population of each ethnic group is, 
and this absolute size of the ethnic population is often more important than its 
share for the statistics agency to decide to include this ethnicity in the official data. 
In other words, even if Kazakhs accounted for about 0.05% in both a small region 
and a large region, they are likely to appear only in the large region’s statistics as 
the absolute size is bigger. This justification turns out to be quite convincing as 
will be shown in the result tables later.  
 
�𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁ℎ𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡� = 𝑏𝑏1 + 𝑏𝑏2 log�𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡� + 𝑏𝑏3𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟 + 𝑏𝑏4 log(𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃 𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤)𝑟𝑟 + 𝐷𝐷𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡 
𝑤𝑤ℎ𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷  𝑁𝑁∗�𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁ℎ𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡� = �1 if 𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁ℎ𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵𝑁𝑁𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡 > 0.05 (%)0 if 𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁ℎ𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵𝑁𝑁𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡 ≤ 0.05 (%) 
 
The use of regional population as the main selection variable also seems to meet 
the exclusion criterion, as it does not directly affect the migration patterns of an 
ethnic group. This is because the total regional population is not likely to have an 
influence on the migration of a certain ethnic group. It would be the population of 
the ethnic group which matters more than the total population of the region. 
Moreover, the absolute population does not need to be included as one of the 
regressors because it is already adjusted when calculating the net migration rates. 
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In fact, the correlation between total population and ethnic migration rates turns 
out to be very weak.  
 
I also include the port dummy and distance from Moscow as other variables 
affecting the selection of net migration data. It is easier to collect the data on 
ethnicity and include them in the statistics if the region has an access by sea or 
big river and it is close to the capital. 
 
Results 
Table 4 summarises the results from OLS and Heckman 2-step estimations for the 
post-collapse sample. Along with ethnic share, employment and conflict, I first put 
wage growth alone in the specification, then replace it with log food consumption, 
and finally include both. 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
Looking at the result shown in Column (1), ethnic share in a region turns out to 
have a positive and significant effect on the net migration of the ethnic group. This 
implies that a person who has a certain ethnicity tends to move to a place where 
his or her co-ethnics account for a high share in the regional population, and/or 
not to move if he or she is already living in such a place. The result remains 
unaffected by the choice of wage growth or food consumption (Column (2) and (3)). 
In an econometric sense, one standard deviation change in ethnic share raises the 
net migration rates by 10.0 to 10.6 per 1000.   
 
It is a confirmation of the hypothesis that the migrants consider the ethnic affinity 
in a region important when they decide to migrate or choose the destination. As a 
result of people choosing to move to the places where their co-ethnics live, ethnic 
un-mixing occurs. At this stage, it is hard to tell whether this effect comes through 
which of the channels I discussed earlier, namely individual utility maximisation, 
network effect and policy, it seems clear that ethnicity has an independent 
influence on migration even after controlling for economic variables. 
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The economic and conflict variables also have significant coefficients with 
predicted signs. Lagged wage growth and employment did have a positive impact 
on regional net migration, reassuring the conclusions of previous studies discussed 
in the hypotheses section. When replacing wage growth with log of food 
consumption, it also turns out to be significant and well explains the net migration 
rates. The relative contributions of food consumption in terms of standardised 
coefficients, 11.4 - 12.3 rises in net migration rates for 1 SD deviation, seem larger 
than those of growth (4.2 - 5.2). They stay significant when both are included 
together, though. On the other hand, the effect of conflict is unclear. Its coefficient 
is negative as predicted and significant at 1% level in Column (1), but it becomes 
significant at 5% level when the food consumption is included and eventually 
insignificant when both wage and food come in the equation (Column (2) and (3)). 
This may indicate that the effect of food reduction absorbs the effect of war. 
 
Column (4), (5) and (6) report the results from first and second step regressions of 
the Heckman correction model. About 30 percent of the sample is censored and the 
selection variables seem to work quite well. The data is more likely to be missing 
when the absolute population of the region is small, there is no major port and 
Moscow is far. The significant inverse mills ratio in all three specifications means 
that there is possible selection bias in the sample which is corrected by the 
Heckman model.  
 
However, the Heckman estimations do not report too much different results from 
what we have in the OLS regression. The sign and significance of ethnic share and 
other economic variables remain unchanged. The relative contributions of ethnic 
share to net migration rates are larger than the standardised coefficients of wage 
growth (4.2 - 5.2), but those of food consumption (11.4 - 12.3) and employment 
share (11.5 - 17.4) turn out to be even larger. The conflict variable, unlike the 
results from OLS model, still stays significant in Column (6).  
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
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I then check the robustness of main variables by trying different combinations of 
control variables, such as temperature range, average house space, number of 
students, passenger distance by bus, number of medical personnel and crime rates, 
etc 20 . Most notable among the results shown in Table 5 is the stability and 
robustness of the ethnic share variable. It keeps reporting significant and positive 
coefficients around 0.30. The expected increase in net migration along with one 
standard deviation change in ethnic share is from 8.3 to 8.6, not too lower than 
the previous results shown in Table 4. It is safe to conclude that the ethnicity is 
one of the most important factors affecting the migration patterns of ethnic groups 
during the decade after the dissolution of the USSR, confirming the hypothesis 
discussed earlier.  
 
The economic variables also turn out to be quite robust even though their 
significance does not maintain as stable as that of ethnic share variable. For 
example, the standardised coefficients for employment share range from 0.17 to 
0.37, which results in the net migration rate change by 8.0 to 17.9 per 1000 
responding to one standard deviation change in employment. The influence of food 
consumption is also somewhat sensitive to the changes in specifications, whose 
standardised contributions vary from 8.4 to 12.8 per 1000. Though the size of 
effects for these economic variables is not as stable, we still can conclude that the 
wage growth, employment, and food consumption level are all important in 
determining net migration rates, given the strong significance of their coefficients 
throughout.  
 
Another interesting aspect of the result above is that other explanatory variables 
related to the welfare and living conditions of residents become significant. This 
is not observed in the late Soviet period and is obviously due to the fact that people 
now are able to choose the place where they want to move and conventional 
variables explaining migration patterns begin to work. Living space per capita, 
education and transport now seem to influence the migration positively, going 
more in line with conventional prediction. Temperature range between winter and                                                              
20 The combination was carefully chosen considering the multicollinearity issue.  
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summer has turned negative and significant, implying that the bigger the 
temperature range is in a region, the more likely the migrants leave or the less 
likely they choose to move there.  
 
Health does not report any significance both in pre- and post-collapse 
specifications. This is possibly due to the universal health care system, which is 
regarded as one of a few legacies of Soviet socialism. People had been already 
benefitting from the relatively equal medical system and there is little reason that 
they consider health care when they decide to move.  
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
I now run the same regressions separately for each ethnic group to see if there are 
differences by ethnicity in responding to ethnic affinity and/or economic conditions. 
In Table 6, you can see that each ethnic group has different responsiveness to the 
explanatory variables. Russians, Ukrainians and Kazakhs were most sensitive to 
ethnic share in the destination or the source, showing standardised coefficients of 
17.7, 7.0 and 7.8, respectively. On the other hands, Belarusians and Armenians do 
not seem to care much about the presence of their co-ethnics in the migrating 
regions. The interesting case is the Jews, who show the negative coefficient on the 
ethnic variable. This may be because when the proportion of Jewish people is high 
in a region, they are better organised and help each other to leave the region more 
easily.  
 
As to the economic variables, each ethnicity shows different sensitivity to them 
again. Some seem to respond more to wage growth (e.g. Armenians and Jews), and 
others seem more to food consumption (e.g. Ukrainians and Belarusians 21 ). 
Kazakhs do not consider the economic conditions very seriously as the data 
constructed in the previous section have suggested.  
                                                             
21 This result is not surprising in that the Slavic countries are famous for their agricultural 
products.  
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When I remove possible exception of ethnic Russians and Jews (Column (7) and 
(8)), the results are reporting the significance of both ethnic and economic 
variables, which again confirms the robustness of the conclusion I draw previously.  
 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
Table 7 summarises the results from OLS and Heckman 2-step estimation for the 
period before the dissolution of the USSR. The results reveal some significant 
determinants of late-Soviet migration, but the interpretation is not so simple 
because migration was still controlled by the Soviet regime during the 1980s. The 
fact that this government regulation was gradually mitigated undergoing 
perestroika and glasnost period in the late 80s makes the interpretation more 
complex. The significant coefficient could be read as one of the government’s 
priorities in allocating people in the region, or as potential migrants’ voluntary 
motivation. 
 
Column (1) shows that the ethnic mixing clearly occurred during this period, being 
inferred from the negative and significant coefficients in the OLS specification. 
Considering the government’s population distribution policy, the migrants were 
likely to be allocated to the places where the share of their co-ethnics was small. 
This result also implies that if one was living in the region dominated by his or 
her own ethnic group, he or she is more likely to leave. This is in line with the 
balanced regional development plan led by the Soviet regime and confirms that 
the ethnicity was among the key criteria of population reallocation.  
 
The magnitude and significance of the ethnic variable remain unaffected by the 
changes in specifications and the combination of other explanatory variables. 
When standardising the size of the ethnic share coefficient, one standard deviation 
change decreases the net migration rates by about 4.7 to 4.8 per 1000. It seems to 
have been among the largest and most significant explanatory variables affecting 
the migration patterns of ethnic groups.  
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The OLS estimation also shows that the wage growth did have an influence on the 
net migration as well as the employment level. When wage is replaced by food 
consumption as shown in column (2), it still seems to influence the migration 
patterns, actually being more significant. Among these three economic variables, 
employment was the only economic variable which might have contributed to the 
migration decision relatively consistently. Other things being equal, one standard 
deviation increase in employment share would raise the net migration into the 
region by 4.4 to 5.3 per 1000, which is similar to or somewhat higher than the 
contribution of ethnic share. The significance of wage growth is gone when both 
the wage and food consumption are included as seen in Column (3).  
 
The results from Heckman correction model are presented in column (4), (5) and 
(6). The Heckman model does not seem to bring about large changes to the signs 
and significance of the main coefficients, except the t-statistics for wage variable 
becomes slightly bigger. We can say that the ethnic share and conflicts negatively 
affect the regional migration patterns whereas the opportunity of food 
consumption and employment positively do so.  
 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
Lastly, I check whether this conclusion remains robust even after trying different 
combinations of control variables. Since wage growth becomes insignificant when 
food consumption is added, I remove wage variable this time. Instead, I add mean 
house space, proxies for education, health, and transport, share of urban 
population, temperature, crime rates, ethnic fractionalisation. It seems that 
employment, house space and education are positively correlated and thus I 
include them separately. The sign and significance of ethnic share variable survive 
all the specifications. In fact, all the ethnic share, food consumption and conflict 
dummy seem robust to the addition of other variables.  
 
Among the control variables, the effects of education and transport are worth 
noting, as their coefficients are consistently reported to be significant. It is against 
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the conventional wisdom that the migrants move towards the place providing 
poorer education and less transportation. The same goes with crime rates, as 
people choose to stay in the places where there are more crimes. This implies that 
the Soviet authorities tried to allocate people by artificially manipulating 
employment level, food consumption or house space in some regions, whose living 
standards were actually not very high. It seems that other variables such as health 
or weather had little influence on the migration patterns in the pre-collapse period, 
and this might be because the migrants had limited autonomy in choosing their 
destinations.  
 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, I have tried to find out the key determinants of net migration during 
the post-Soviet transition period. While the conventional migration literature 
emphasised the role of economic motivations, I argue that the ethnicity also 
exerted a significant influence on the migration decision and destination choice.  
 
Using the newly constructed dataset, I conducted OLS and Heckman 2 step 
estimations on the pre- and post-dissolution periods separately. As the hypotheses 
predicted, the role of ethnic share turns out to be negative in the late-Soviet period 
and positive in the post-Soviet period. This result confirms that the trend of ethnic 
mixing occurring in the Soviet period was reversed after its dissolution and the 
following abolition of migration restrictions. Economic variables, notably wages, 
employment and food consumption, seem to explain migration patterns strongly 
for both the late- and post-Soviet periods. Also, the presence of civil wars did have 
significant coefficients in some cases but not consistently. The significance 
becomes weaker when food consumption is included in the post-Soviet 
specifications and this might indicate that the food shortage was the channel 
through which the conflicts affected migration. This paper also reveals that 
different ethnic groups have responded to ethnic and economic factors differently.  
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Another interesting finding in this paper is that the variables related to the living 
standards of residents, namely housing space, education or weather, had little 
influence on migration patterns during the Soviet period, possibly due to the lack 
of autonomy in choosing destinations. However, the post-Soviet specifications 
show that the living conditions began to have a stronger impact on migration 
decision.  
 
I would like to highlight once again the improvement of my method and data 
compared to the previous literature. First and foremost, it has enabled to include 
the ethnic aspect in migration analysis. Second, the sample spans both pre- and 
post-collapse periods, which has never done in the previous quantitative analyses. 
Last, it captures the effect on long-term migration, which occurred between two 
census periods usually having a 10-year gap. Though annual data might be useful 
in observing short-term trend changes more easily, my data can be useful to find 
out the fundamental determinants of migration. The methods and conclusions 
suggested in this paper not only contribute to the better understanding of Soviet 
and post-Soviet migration patterns but also can be used in the analyses of the 
migration patterns for different regions or periods, as the literature looking at the 
determinants of migration from the ethnic perspective has been rare. This 
research combining with future similar studies may enhance our understanding 
on the recent rise of nationalism and policymakers’ intention to increase or 
decrease ethnic homogeneity in a country by controlling immigration.  
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1. Regression results for average number of births per woman, 1989 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Average number of births 
per woman 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Urbanisation rate -1.43
*** -1.49*** -1.29*** -1.35*** 
(-8.07) (-8.25) (-8.75) (-9.13) 
Sex ratio imbalance -2.29
*** -2.07***   
(-4.04) (-3.76)   
Log (Sex ratio imbalance)   -0.20
*** -0.18*** 
  (-7.47) (-6.71) 
Central Asia  0.32
***  0.19** 
 (3.10)  (2.08) 
Constant 3.22
*** 3.20*** 2.37*** 2.43*** 
(36.22) (37.44) (17.55) (17.91) 
Total observation 101 101 101 101 
R2 0.62 0.65 0.71 0.73 
 
Note: In parentheses are t-statistics. ***, **, * denote the significance level of 1%, 5%, 10%, 
respectively.  
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Table 2. Net migration of the ethnic groups, Annual average and per 1000, 
1979-89  
Economic 
Regions All  Russians Ukrainians Armenians Kazakhs Tatars Jews Germans 
North 
4,394  7,013  2,060  62  151  565  -202  -221  
(0.7) (1.5) (7.2) (10.6) (44.2) (13.4) (-29.1) (-12.2) 
North-West 
42,154  36,901  4,833  434  404  434  -3,663  82  
(5.3) (5.1) (23.8) (34.3) (70.8) (8.5) (-28.0) (12.4) 
Central 83,169  70,288  10,470  1,998  634  1,560  -5,968  342  
(2.8) (2.5) (17.0) (36.1) (43.5) (6.2) (-23.5) (16.2) 
Volga-
Vyatka 
-25,630  -11,261  1,048  106  138  -2,549  -328  10  
(-3.0) (-1.8) (16.2) (28.6) (74.7) (-10.9) (-20.1) (3.0) 
Central 
Black Earth 
-16,093  -15,844  365  322  75  100  -309  47  
(-2.1) (-2.1) (1.5) (67.4) (38.5) (14.0) (-27.7) (14.2) 
Volga -6,746  -11,524  20  1,000  1,260  -5,502  -960  408  
(-0.4) (-1.0) (0.1) (50.7) (5.1) (-2.5) (-22.7) (6.4) 
North 
Caucasia 
5,895  -11,881  4,042  8,576  181  -891  -1,520  668  
(0.4) (-1.1) (8.9) (28.1) (21.5) (-14.0) (-36.6) (11.2) 
Ural -57,712  -27,574  -3,283  401  39  -1,914  -1,174  -1,424  
(-2.9) (-1.9) (-7.4) (33.5) (0.2) (-1.0) (-24.6) (-9.5) 
West Siberia 86,799  57,317  15,148  787  532  4,879  -479  -1,884  
(6.2) (4.8) (31.2) (67.7) (4.5) (13.9) (-19.0) (-4.6) 
East-Siberia 5,335  5,299  2,564  412  290  -1,499  -423  -690  
(0.6) (0.7) (10.1) (50.5) (37.0) (-12.8) (-34.6) (-10.5) 
Far East 33,000  23,261  6,888  431  350  -20  -499  219  
(4.5) (3.9) (12.4) (50.0) (40.8) (-0.2) (-21.7) (12.6) 
Ukraine1) 13,808  33,229  -15,994  1,405  333  -275  -14,770  371  (0.6) (5.1) (-1.1) (30.3) (37.7) (-3.2) (-26.4) (10.3) 
West 
(Baltic) 
24,109  16,041  4,601  310  89  224  -895  -105  
(2.8) (7.0) (21.0) (48.9) (43.0) (14.1) (-18.9) (-9.7) 
Trans-
caucasia 
-64,246  -20,925  367  -37,509  222  -1,039  -1,549  -113  
(-4.3) (-24.6) (4.2) (-9.9) (67.2) (-29.8) (-34.2) (-37.8) 
Central Asia -100,262  -40,024  2,512  50  5,356  -14,617 -1,178  -5,258  
(-3.4) (-12.1) (7.9) (0.6) (6.4) (-21.3) (-13.1) (-29.0) 
Kazakhstan -85,835  -49,184  -6,662  292  -12,758  -876  -427  -5,771  
(-5.5) (-8.1) (-7.4) (17.6) (-2.2) (-2.7) (-20.7) (-6.2) 
Belarus -2,823  16,121  4,549  188  91  145  -2,120  83  
(-0.3) (13.0) (17.4) (49.0) (50.3) (12.5) (-17.1) (27.7) 
Moldova -6,392  2,441  -968  67  44  34  -1,893  -525  
(-1.5) (4.6) (-1.7) (27.8) (53.3) (11.2) (-26.0) (-56.1) 
Note: per 1,000 rates are in parenthesis. See text for the sources and estimation method. 
1) Ukraine includes three economic regions: Donetsk- Dnieper, South-West, and South.  
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Table 3. Net migration of the ethnic groups, Annual average and per 1000, 
1989-2000 
Economic 
Region All Russians Ukrainians Armenians Kazakhs Tatars Jews 
German
s 
North -53,996  -32,210  -9,825  220  -212  -1,285  -232  -333  
 (-9.5)  (-6.8)  (-40.2)  (28.7)  (-68.7)  (-32.5)  (-52.0)  (-20.9) 
North-West 26,474  7,600  -4,582  1,242  -276  -171  -4,871  117  
 (3.3)  (1.1)  (-24.0)  (56.6)  (-46.4)  (-3.3)  (-64.4)  (15.6) 
Central 240,643  164,801  -2,978  12,613  -277  2,238  -7,965  401  
 (7.9)  (5.9)  (-4.7)  (89.2)  (-17.3)  (8.3)  (-49.5)  (16.3) 
Volga-
Vyatka 
1,396  6,502  -1,173  1,009  -99  -355  -516  100  
 (0.2)  (1.1)  (-19.0)  (96.7)  (-50.4)  (-1.6)  (-48.7)  (25.5) 
Central 
Black Earth 
35,198  33,886  -4,201  2,122  -73  450  -374  307  
 (4.6)  (4.7)  (-19.7)  (109.8)  (-39.0)  (43.5)  (-56.4)  (57.4) 
Volga 60,820  40,714  -6,541  5,609  1,514  18,457  -1,342  -1,350  
 (3.7)  (3.4)  (-21.7)  (93.3)  (5.5)  (7.7)  (-48.2)  (-23.0) 
North 
Caucasia 
178,249  67,554  -11,235  18,728  -160  737  -1,545  -1,967  
 (10.0)  (5.9)  (-27.6)  (40.0)  (-17.8)  (10.8)  (-62.8)  (-37.7) 
Ural 14,881  17,204  -9,094  2,780  593  -15,432  -1,528  -4,238  
 (0.7)  (1.2)  (-24.1)  (87.1)  (3.3)  (-8.2)  (-49.0)  (-35.1) 
West Siberia 7,045  25,942  -11,896  2,679  121  -1,186  -881  -10,100  
 (0.5)  (2.0)  (-23.4)  (80.7)  (0.9)  (-3.0)  (-51.7)  (-29.0) 
East-Siberia -44,403  -29,516  -9,572  1,098  -372  -1,773  -361  -809  
 (-5.0)  (-4.0)  (-44.3)  (62.0)  (-47.9)  (-16.6)  (-45.7)  (-13.3) 
Far East -98,778  -62,574  -26,096  515  -478  -2,786  -1,011  -475  
 (-13.5)  (-10.6)  (-57.8)  (35.4)  (-58.3)  (-38.6)  (-71.3)  (-28.5) 
Donetsk- 
Dnieper 
-12,205  -92,346  91,846  2,254  -383  -844  -8,287  -281  
 (-0.6)  (-15.7)  (6.5)  (50.4)  (-47.8)  (-16.9)  (-79.6)  (-15.9) 
South- West -23,726  -49,236  38,622  421  -383  -305  -13,341  60  
 (-1.1)  (-35.6)  (2.0)  (30.7)  (-47.8)  (-31.2)  (-106.0)  (6.3) 
South 1,437  -31,251  22,451  1,256  -383  390  -5,936  -14  
 (0.2)  (-12.1)  (5.5)  (67.3)  (-47.8)  (19.0)  (-91.3)  (-1.7) 
West 
(Baltic) 
-30,648  -18,828  -6,190  N/A N/A 4,423  -1,771  508  
 (-3.6)  (-8.4)  (-30.2)  (96.4)  (-57.9)  (36.9) 
Trans-
Caucasus 
-168,670  -51,689  -4,762  -70,543  N/A N/A N/A N/A 
 (-10.8)  (-102.5)  (-72.8)  (-19.0) 
Central Asia -303,242  -143,849  -18,444  -2,800  -13,580  -29,718  N/A -16,944  
 (-8.4)  (-52.7)  (-70.9)  (-32.9)  (-13.2)  (-55.3)  (-159.8) 
Kazakhstan -322,057  -208,906  -36,078  -557  129,990  -9,467  -1,177  -67,850  
 (-20.5)  (-39.0)  (-50.0)  (-32.9)  (17.9)  (-32.8)  (-93.3)  (-103.5) 
Belarus 11,163  -14,009  -4,451  N/A N/A -229  -7,903  N/A 
 (1.1)  (-11.3)  (-16.9)  (-20.3)  (-113.1) 
Moldova -34,307  -12,107  -10,620  N/A N/A N/A -3,858  N/A 
 (-8.3)  (-26.0)  (-20.4)  (-109.4) 
Note: per 1,000 rates are in parenthesis. The raion level net migration data are not available for 
some ethnic groups mainly due to their negligible size.  
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Table 4. OLS & Heckman 2-step estimation, after the collapse 
Dependent 
Variable:  
Net migration 
per 1,000 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
OLS 
(4) 
Heckman 
(5) 
Heckman 
(6) 
Heckman 
Ethnic Share 0.35
*** 0.33*** 0.32*** 0.35*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 
(6.07) (5.77) (5.76) (6.23) (5.87) (5.88) 
Wage 1.27
***  0.79** 1.35***  0.90*** 
(4.86)  (3.02) (5.14)  (3.44) 
Food 
consumption 
 68.67*** 62.62***  67.77*** 60.43*** 
 (8.56) (7.61)  (8.13) (7.08) 
Employment 1.58
*** 2.27*** 2.02*** 1.67*** 2.30*** 2.01*** 
(9.24) (14.75) (11.53) (9.50) (14.69) (11.41) 
Conflict -23.07
*** -9.44* -10.03* -24.31*** -12.41** -13.13** 
(-6.10) (-2.33) (-2.49) (-6.36) (-3.07) (-3.27) 
Dummy for 
ethnicity O O O O O O 
Selection equation 
(DV: Ethnic Share over 0.05%) 
Regional 
population 
   0.24*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 
   (3.93) (3.93) (3.93) 
Port 
   0.63*** 0.63*** 0.63*** 
   (5.58) (5.58) (5.58) 
Distance to 
Moscow 
   -0.14** -0.14** -0.14** 
   (-2.90) (-2.90) (-2.90) 
Total 
observation 824 824 824 1029 1029 1029 
R2 0.61 0.63 0.64    
Censored  obs.    284 284 284 
Inverse mills 
ratio  
   -18.83** -12.14* -12.50* 
   (-2.52) (-1.70) (-1.76) 
 
Note: In parentheses are t-statistics (z-statistics for Heckman estimators). ***, **, * denote the 
significance level of 1%, 5%, 10% respectively. For definitions and sources of variables, see the text. 
33 
Table 5. Robustness check, Heckman 2-step estimation, after collapse 
Dependent 
Variable:  
Net migration 
per 1,000 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Ethnic share 0.30
*** 0.30*** 0.28*** 0.29*** 0.30*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 
(5.54) (5.76) (5.50) (5.68) (5.94) (6.00) (5.88) 
Wage growth 1.07
*** 1.26*** 1.20*** 0.41 0.50 0.65* 0.67** 
(3.91) (4.87) (4.70) (1.60) (1.96) (2.54) (2.61) 
Food 
consumption 
66.68*** 45.12*** 43.60*** 79.07*** 92.80*** 73.33*** 70.19*** 
(7.29) (4.90) (4.79) (9.82) (10.79) (8.02) (7.54) 
Conflict -12.13** 
-
16.98*** -11.51** 
-
16.44*** -12.75** 
-
14.97*** -13.15** 
(-2.80) (-4.07) (-2.73) (-4.55) (-3.25) (-3.77) (-3.22) 
Employment  2.08
*** 2.22*** 2.03***     
(10.25) (10.75) (9.76)     
House space    6.81
*** 7.65*** 6.98*** 6.60*** 
   (16.33) (16.38) (14.80) (12.84) 
Education 0.03 0.14
** 0.22***  0.19*** 0.23*** 0.24*** 
(0.62) (3.14) (4.71)  (4.39) (5.13) (5.40) 
Health -0.08 0.58 0.73  0.12 0.65 0.76 (-0.11) (0.92) (1.17)  (0.21) (1.12) (1.30) 
Transportation  9.98
* 14.53**   13.80** 15.81*** 
 (1.98) (2.88)   (2.99) (3.34) 
Weather  -1.38
*** -1.31***   -0.63*** -0.63*** 
 (-8.29) (-7.94)   (-3.96) (-3.98) 
Crime rates   0.00    0.00   (0.33)    (0.41) 
Ethnic Diversity   
-
32.16***    -11.19 
  (-5.32)    (-1.80) 
Dummy for 
ethnicity O O O O O O O 
Selection 
equation O O O O O O O 
Total observation 1012 1012 1012 1009 1009 1009 1009 
Censored  obs. 284 284 284 284 284 284 284 
Uncensored obs. 728 728 728 725 725 725 725 
Inverse mills 
ratio  
-14.11 -18.16* -0.47 -5.19 -19.76** -22.99** -12.99 
(-1.92) (-2.32) (-0.06) (-0.72) (-2.70) (-3.04) (-1.79) 
 
Note: In parentheses are z-statistics. ***, **, * denote the significance level of 1%, 5%, 10% 
respectively.   
34 
Table 6. Sensitivity variation by nationality, Heckman 2-step estimation 
Dependent 
Variable:  
Net migration 
per 1,000 
(1) 
Rus 
(2) 
Ukr 
(3) 
Bel 
(4) 
Arm 
(5) 
Kaz 
(6) 
Jew 
(7) 
Non-
Rus 
(8) 
Non-
Jew 
Ethnic share 17.7
*** 7.0** 1.8 0.2 7.8** -8.0*** 6.4*** 8.1*** 
(6.12) (1.95) (1.05) (0.04) (2.11) (-3.92) (5.07) (5.37) 
Wage growth 7.3
*** 2.3 2.3 11.0** 2.1 6.4*** 4.3*** 4.8*** 
(4.51) (1.09) (1.26) (2.18) (0.52) (3.47) (3.26) (3.69) 
Food 
consumption 
5.6*** 10.4*** 6.1*** 10.3* 6.7 -2.5 6.0*** 7.5*** 
(2.83) (3.61) (2.65) (1.76) (1.40) (-0.99) (3.72) (10.80) 
Employment  2.8 6.5
* 16.5*** 24.1*** 6.1 0.4*** 15.1*** 13.1*** 
(1.08) (1.91) (7.24) (4.15) (1.02) (4.37) (9.10) (8.27) 
Control 
variables O O O O O O O O 
Dummy for 
ethnicity X X X X X X O O 
Selection 
variables O O O O O O O O 
Total 
observation 156 156 156 159 159 156 1098 1099 
Censored  obs. 49 49 53 54 82 53 398 394 
Uncensored obs. 107 107 103 105 77 103 700 705 
Inverse mills 
ratio -10.35* 
-
20.98**
* -14.10* 
-
52.06** -5.97 -15.99* 
-
23.85**
* 
-
23.89**
* 
(-1.73) (-2.57) (-1.68) (-2.04) (-0.22) (-1.94) (-3.69) (-3.84) 
  
Note: Standardised coefficients (Change in net migration per 1,000 responding to 1 SD increase in 
X) are reported for an easy comparison. In parentheses are z-statistics. ***, **, * denote the 
significance level of 1%, 5%, 10% respectively.   
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Table 7. OLS & Heckman 2-step estimation, before collapse 
Dependent 
Variable:  
Net migration 
per 1,000 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
OLS 
(4) 
Heckman 
(5) 
Heckman 
(6) 
Heckman 
Ethnic Share -0.21*** -0.23*** -0.23*** -0.21*** -0.22*** -0.23*** (-6.13) (-6.63) (-6.65) (-6.30) (-6.62) (-6.66) 
Wage Growth 0.30**  0.20 0.35**  0.27* (2.03)  (1.34) (2.32)  (1.78) 
Food 
consumption 
 20.65*** 19.52***  16.71*** 14.87*** 
(4.25) (3.96)  (3.21) (2.81) 
Employment 0.94*** 0.97*** 0.90*** 0.87*** 0.94*** 0.85*** (9.05) (10.58) (8.72) (8.29) (10.13) (8.11) 
Conflict -6.01*** -6.65*** -5.79** -9.16*** -9.54*** -8.51*** (-2.66) (-3.10) (-2.58) (-3.62) (-4.01) (-3.46) 
Dummy for 
ethnicity O O O O O O 
Selection equation  
(DV: Ethnic data availability) 
Regional 
population 
   0.29*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 
  (4.94) (4.94) (4.94) 
Port    0.63*** 0.63*** 0.63***   (5.94) (5.94) (5.94) 
Distance to 
Moscow 
   -0.11** -0.11** -0.11** 
  (-2.42) (-2.42) (-2.42) 
Total 
observation 939 939 813 1,269 1,269 1,269 
Censored  obs.    348 348 348 
R2 0.50 0.51 0.52    
Inverse mills 
ratio   
  -16.59*** -12.15*** -12.75*** 
 
 
(-3.47) (-2.54) (-2.65) 
 
Note: In parentheses are t-statistics (z-statistics for Heckman estimators). ***, **, * denote the 
significance level of 1%, 5%, 10% respectively. For definitions and sources of variables, see the text. 
  
36 
Table 8. Robustness check, Heckman 2-step estimation, before collapse  
Dependent 
Variable:  
Net migration  
per 1,000 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Ethnic Share -0.22
*** -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.21*** -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.22*** 
(-6.30) (-6.33) (-6.51) (-6.23) (-6.52) (-6.58) (-6.68) 
Food 
consumption 
23.40*** 28.71*** 28.05*** 32.98*** 35.04*** 15.23** 20.48*** 
(3.38) (3.92) (3.87) (5.02) (5.24) (2.23) (2.80) 
Conflict 
-
10.86*** 
-
12.27*** 
-
10.22*** 
-
12.21*** 
-
10.84*** 
-
10.42*** 
-
10.12*** 
(-4.13) (-4.82) (-3.97) (-4.97) (-4.20) (-4.37) (-4.06) 
Employment 0.98
*** 0.80*** 0.56***     
(8.42) (5.76) (6.75)     
House space    2.65
*** 1.84***   
   (9.53) (4.67)   
Education      -0.27
*** -0.22*** 
     (-10.90) (-5.77) 
Health -0.78 -1.16
* -0.75 -0.25 -0.86 -0.36 -0.75 
(-1.39) (-1.92) (-1.24) (-0.49) (-1.43) (-0.72) (-1.29) 
Transportation -1.59 -2.10
** -2.01** -2.37** -2.04** -3.32*** -2.97*** 
(-1.63) (-2.10) (-2.12) (-2.52) (-2.08) (-3.63) (-3.14) 
Weather  -0.28
* -0.21  0.04  0.01 
 (-2.11) (-1.55)  (0.30)  (0.04) 
Crime rates  0.83
** 0.87***  0.84***  0.58* 
 (2.46) (2.62)  (2.63)  (1.78) 
Ethnic Diversity   
-
18.22***  
-
12.27***  -6.71 
  (-4.82)  (-2.90)  (-1.48) 
Dummy for 
ethnicity O O O O O O O 
Selection 
Variables O O O O O O O 
Total observation 1245 1245 1245 1245 1245 1245 1245 
Censored  obs. 348 348 348 348 348 348 348 
Uncensored obs. 897 897 897 897 897 897 897 
Inverse mills 
ratio  
-11.02** -10.28** -11.76** -9.45* -13.32** -4.2 -7.58 
(-2.16) (-1.94) (-2.22) (-1.89) (-2.52) (-0.86) (-1.45) 
 
Note: In parentheses are z-statistics for Heckman estimators. ***, **, * denote the significance level 
of 1%, 5%, 10% respectively. For definitions and sources of variables, see the text. 
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Source: Goskomstat USSR (1990 
  
Figure 1. The Administrative divisions of USSR, 1974 
Source: Map Collection, Perry-Castañeda Library, University of Texas-Austin 
Figure 2. Fertility and urbanisation rates / sex ratios 
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Figure 3. Regional net migration rates of major ethnic groups, 1979-89 
 
Note: Each map has a different legend.  
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Figure 4. Regional net migration rates of major ethnic groups, 1989-2000 
 
Note: Each map has a different legend.  
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Figure 5. Regional net migration of titular ethnic groups, pre- and post-
collapse periods comparison 
 
